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ABSTRACT
This paper finds that compensation premia and not pension backloading
are responsible for the low mobility rates from jobs with pensions.
Compensation premia, which may represent efficiency wages, are calculated
as the difference in compensation between the current job and the best
alternative job, allowing for the fact that such premia are observed only
for job changers. The amount of pension backloading is calculated from
data provided by employers to the Survey of Consumer Finances, greatly
improving the precision of measurement over past efforts. This finding has
important implications for labor market analysis and for policies
concerning pension regulation.
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Department of Economics Department of Economics
Dartmouth College Texas Tech University
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it is a well—established empirical result that individuals in jobs
with pensions have very low mobility rates from those jobs (Bartel and
Borjas, 1977; Mitchell1 1982, 1983; McCormick and Hughes, 1984). For
example, according to data from the Survey of Consumer Finances, an
individual remained in the same job over a five year period 91% of the time
if the job involved a pension but only 44Z of the time if the job was not
covered by a pension. This paper will explore empirically the causes of
the negative relation between pension coverage and job mobility.In
particular, is the relation due to some feature of the pension itself, or
is it the result of some other characteristic of pension—covered jobs?
One explanation for this negative relation is that defined benefit
plans, which are the predominant farm of pensions, calculate benefits from
formulae using job tenure and/or wages, and such calculations typically
cause benefit; to accrue disproportionately in the later years of
employment (Bulow, 1981, 1982; Kotlikoff and Wise, 1985, 1987). This
"backloading" of benefits produces a potentially large cost of separation
for a worker who has accumulated a significant amount of tenure on the job,
and this cost in turn discourages mobility from jobs with a pension of this
type (Ippolito, 1986; Allen, Clark and McDermed, 1986).1 An alternative
explanation is that pension jobs may offer individuals a compensation
"premium' over and above what the individual could obtain on most other
jobs. Payment of compensation premia would make it relatively unlikely
that those covered by pensions will be attracted to another job by a
superior offer.A rationale for such premia is provided in the recent
literature on efficiency wages.2
The lack of mobility among pension covered employees has recently
created concern among policy makers that the design of pension benefit
1formulae Is responsible for reducing the mobility of this group.A related
concern is that pension backloading unduly penalizes those who do move.
Despite theoretical arguments that backloading enhances an individual's
productivity over the course of the job, there is no empirical evidence
which links pensions or specific pension plan characteristics directly to
productivity. Only indirect evidence of any such linkage is available
(Allen and Clark, 1987).If pension backloading does create large barriers
to mobility, and if these barriers are not justified by the productivity
enhancing effects of the backloading, then policy makers may find it
desirable to Introduce regulations to discourage the practice of
backloading pension benefits. However, this line of reasoning assumes that
backloading is the major cause of low mobility rates among pension—covered
workers, and to date the empirical validity of this assumption has by no
means been established.
Although it has long been recognized that the financial incentives
created by pensions may affect mobility, many studies of mobility simply
ignore pensions. Those that do pay attention to pensions typically relate
mobility or job tenure to pension coverage or to vesting status and plan
characteristics, not to the value of the potential loss which a pension can
generate if an individual moves to another job.The exception is Allen,
Clark and McDermed (1986, 1987), which uses the dollar value of pension
incentives In an equation for turnover. However, that study failsto
consider the possibility of compensation premia on pension jobs, and as a
result it is unable to assesstherelative importance of pension
backloading and compensation premla in discouraging turnover in pension—
covered jobs.
The major finding of this study is that it is not the backloading of
2pension benefit formulae that is responsible for thu negative relation
between pension coverage and mobility. Those who are covered by pensions
receive a higher level of compensation on their jobs than do those without
pensions, and at least a part of this appears to be a compensation premium
over and above what they could obtain elsewhere.It is this premium,
rather than the pension loss from moving, that accounts for the lower
mobility of pension covered workers. Therefore, although a reduction in
backloading could bm accomplished, for example, by mandating defined
contribution plans, such a policy would not produce major changes in job
mobility among pension covered workers unless the pre.ia paid to these
workers were to fall drastically as a result.
The organization of this paper is as follows. The next section
presents descriptive statistics on the relation among mobility, pensions1
and compensation. Section III introduces the analytical model used in the
study, and the following section outlines the econometric method used to
estimate the model. Section V discusses the empirical implementation of
the model, followed in Section VI by estimates of the model. Section VII
presents the results of two sets of simulations, the first of which
indicates how well the model tracks the mobility behavior of different
groups and the second of which analyzes the nature of the influence of
pensions on job mobility. This section also examines potential reasons for
the difference in findings from those of Allen, Clark and McDermed (1987).
A final section summarizes the study and discusses implications of the
findings for labor market analysis and for pension regulation and policies.
11. Descriptive Statistics.
This section will present some basic descriptive statistic, pertinent
to the relations among pensions, compensation and job mobility. The source
3of the data ii the Survey of Consumer Finance. CSCF), which Is a single
random cross—section sample of households taken in 1983. Detailed
employment information was obtained only for the head of the household and
the spouse, but since the focus of this study is middle—aged males, few of
whom are not household heads, the household orientation of the survey
should not present a major problem. The basic sample consists of 602 non-
agricultural private—sector lull—time male employees who were 30 to 50
years old in 1978 and who were not in the special high—income supplement to
the SCF sample.3 44 of these observations are eliminated because of faulty
information on experience, industry or occupation, leaving a final sample
of 558.
Pensions and Mobility.
Table 1 presents rather striking results on the relation between
pensions and mobility. An individual is considered to be a møver if he
took a new job during the five year period immediately preceding the
survey, that is, during the period t978—83. Since the individuals in the
sample were 30—50 years old in 1978, the mobility being considered occurs
after the turbulence at the beginning of a working career but before
retirement decisions become dominant. The pension status information in
the table refers to the status at the beginning of the period. Among the
entire group of 558 individuals in the final sample, 2G of them moved at
some point during the five year period and 72X remained with the same
employer. These figures vary dramatically with pension status, however.
Among individuals with pensions in 1978, over 91% remained with the
employer over thu next five years, while among those without pensions only
about 44% stayed with the employer.
Before considering the remainder the table, it is important to
4mention a non—trivial problem with the 6Cr. The 6Cr, whilefundamentally a
cross—section survey, did attempt to gather information on each
individual's job history.To be specific, after gathering information
about the current job, the survey inquired about the individual 'slongest
previous job md also about any other jobs covered by pensions. Thismeans
that information was not always collected about the job held in 1978.
Since the job history did inquire about pension jobs, the pension statusof
the 1978 job can always be established, but unleis the jobwas covered by a
pension, was the same as the 1983 job, or was the longest prior job, no
information was collected. This is the case for the 1976 jobs of about 15
percent of the sample, all of wham were movers without pensions in those
jobs.
Returning to the table, the bottom part of the table reports on
personal and job characteristics for those with and those without pensions
in their 1978 jobs. The job characteristics reported in this tablepertain
to the longest job, so that comparable information is available for the
entire sample. The longest job usually coincides with the job held in
1976, but even in cases where it does not we would expect the job
characteristics of the 1978 job to be fairly well correlated with the
characteristics of the longest job.In this table, it is evident that
although pensions are strongly correlated with tendencies toward mobility,
difference; in other job and personal characteristic;may also explain the
lack of mobility from jobs covered by pensions. Although theaverage age,
experience, and education do not differ greatly between those covered and
not covered by pensions in 1978, those covered are much morelikely to have
held their longest jobs with manufacturing firms that were large and
unionized. All three of these characteristics tend to be associated with
higher compensation, which provides a further incentive to stay in the job.
5Moreover, those with pensions are about 9 percentage point. more likely to
own a home, which would inhibit geographic mobility and miy inhibit job
mobility as well. Thus, while pensions are a strong potential determinant
of mobility, other variables are closely related to mobility as well.
Mobility and Compensation.
Table 2 documents the compensation levels in the 1978 job and in the
alternative job for various groups. The first two columns includu all
individuals for whom compensation can be calculated for the job held in
1978, a group comprising 396 individuals. The last two columns are limited
to individuals who changed jobs between 1978 and 1983, and for whom
compensation can be calculated in both jobs.
Compensation is calculated as the average per hour amount of wages
plus increases in pension values between 1978 and either the individual 's
expected date of retirement from full—time work or the normal retirement
age specified in the individual's pension plan (if he had one), whichever
is earlier. If the individual did not provide an expected retirementage,
the terminal date for the compensation calculations is taken to be the
normal retirement age in the pension plan if the individual had one andage
65 if he did not. Real wages each year are imputed on the basis of a
regression of log wages on experience, experience squared, tenure, tenure
squared, interactions of both experience and tenure with education, union
status and firm size, and a set of other standard explanatory variables
including marital status, race, sex, health status, union status, firm
size, SMSA residence, industry categories (8), and geographical regions
(4).A nominal wage profile Is created by using the observed wage and
extrapolating to dates before and after on the basis of the estimated
coefficients for the experience and tenure variables in thewage equation,
6taking into account the general growth of nominal wages. Pension values
are calculated by applying the resulting wage profile to the individuals
own pension. All compensation amounts reported in Table 2 and elsewhere in
this paper ire discounted to 1983 and expressed in 2983 dollars.5
The first two columns of the table look at all pension covered and
non—covered individuals for whom compensation amount. are available for the
1978 job. The compensation differential between the twogroups is quite
substantial, with the log compensation amounts translating to $14.45 and
$8.19, respectively. It must be noted that compensation amounts are
unavailable for a nontrivial fraction of the sample, raising the
possibility of selection problems. Wages are missing for about 15 percent
of the 2978 jobs that are observed, and among individuals withoutpensions
in 1978, the 1978 job is not included in the job history about 377. of the
time.A comparison between the observed variables and thecorresponding
variables in Table 1, however, suggests that the selectionprocess for
observing compensation has not had a large effect, at least as far as these
variables are concerned.
The next two columns look at job movers with and without pensions for
whom observation, on compensation both on the 1978 and the 1993 jobare
available. The compensation amounts in the original job do notappear to
be very different from the amounts given in the first two columns, which
included the movers and stayers combined. However, the compensation
amounts in the 1983 jobs tell a much different andvery interesting story.
Movers without pensions in their 1979 job gained anaverage of about 17% in
compensation, while movers with pensions in their 1970 job lost an average
of 17% of their compensation.It should be noted that covers with pension
in 1978 may be more likely than movers without a pension to have been
7separated via a layoff rather than a quit. Nevertheless, these figures
would certainly suggest the possibility that the alternative job
opportunities of individuals with pension; are not as renurerative,
relative to the original job, as the opportunities of those without
pensions. Although movers with pensions originally had a 76X compensation
advantage on their 1970 job over those without pensions, the advantage
dropped to only 25X in the 1983 job. This pattern is also found in the
degree to which movers found new jobs with pensions. Among movers from
pension jobs, 43.3 found new jobs with pensions, while among movers from
jobs without pensions the figure was 37,5%,6 It appears that covers from
pension jobs were not much more successful at finding new Jobs with
pensions than were •overs from jobs without pensions.
Table 3 attempts to decompose the differential between the t978 Job
compensation of those with and without pensions. The first and last
figures in the first column indicate the total per hour compensation from
1978 until retirement for the two groups these are limply repeated from
Table 2.The second figure in the column asks the question: For those with
pensions, what would the compensation until retirement have been if pension
amount over the lifetime of the job had been held constant, but pension
value had accumulated in the fashion of a defined contribution plan? In
essence, the difference between this number and the number immediately
above it is the pension loss which occurs because actual pension plans
accumulate value disproportionately at the end of the job rather than
smoothly over the life of the job. The loss amount, amortized over the
time until retirement, is only about 3X, but because these individuals have
approximately 22 years until retirement, the lump sum value of the loss is
a little over $17,000 in 1983 dollars,In comparison, Allen, Clark, and
tlcDermed (1987) find an average loss for 35—44 year oHs (our sample is 30—
850 years old) of $6530 in 1974 dollars, which translates to about $12,000
in 1983 dollars. This is probably some understatement because their
procedure does not catch the sizable spikes in incremental pension value
which occur at the early and normal retirement ages in many pension plans
(Kotlikoff and Wise, 1987; and Guetman and Steinmeier, 1987), and it also
seems likely that pension generosity increased to some degree between 1974
and 1983.All things considered3 thin, the findings of the two studies
appear to agree reasonably well as to the general order of magnitude of the
pension loss, and it would certainly not appear that the loss estimates
used in this study are too small relative to the Allen, Clark and IlcDermed
figures.
In Table 3, the lump sum loss is amortized over the remaining time
until retirement. This would appear to be the appropriate figure to use in
a study of mobility, since the question isi If the individual is separated
from the present job, what would the new Job have to pay in order to enable
the individual to earn as much as he could if he continued in the present
Job? Since mobility rates from pension jobs are so low, most individuals
in pension jobs will be in those Jobs until close to their retirement age.
Thus, although a typical individual may suffer a $17,000 pension loss if he
leaves his current Job, he has 22 years in which to make up this los, in
the new job.At 2000 hours per year, this works out to about 38 cents per
hour, which is about 2.7% of compensation. The dollar value of th. pension
loss may look sizable, but it Is a relatively small component of the value
of the job. More sizable is the value of the pension itself, as implied by
the third figure in the first column. This figure gives mean log hourly
earnings until retirement for individuals with pensions, excluding the
value of the pensions. The difference between this figure and the one
9above it indicates that over the life of the job, pensions contribute about
11.9% of compensation, a percentage that agrees reasonably well with
previous work (Allen, Clark and McDermed, 1986; and Gustman arid Steinmeier,
1987)
The second colunn of Table 3 indicates the components of the
differential (calculated as differences between adjacent values of log
compensation in the first column), and the third column gives the
percentage of the total differential of 0.568 which is accounted for by
each component. The results are striking. Of the total value until
retirement of a typical job, the backloading of pension benefits accounts
for only about 5% of the gross difference between pension jobs and non—
pension jobs. The value of pensions themselves accounts for a much larger
share, almost 20%, but by far the largest part of the difference, at over
75%, is due to the fact that pension jobs typically pay much higher wages
than do non—pension jobs.
III.A Model of Mobility.
This section will introduce the mobility model to be employed in the
empirical analysis. The model consists of a set of four equations
describing the two compensation opportunities, the mobility decision, and a
selection equation. The first is a probit equation governing the mobility
decision:
(1) N u(ln(C) —ln(C))+ + e
IIis a latent variable which is positive if a job change occurs during the
period and negative if it does not.ln(C) —1n(C)is the "compensation
gain" if an individual changes jobs, with Cc and Ca being the
compensation levels in the current and alternative jobs in 1978. is a
10vector of exogenous explanatory variable;, and is a normally
distributed random error term.




(3) ln(C )= +
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where the X's are vectors of explanatory variable; and the i's are the
error terms for these equations. The compensation level; include both the
value of wages and the Increments in the values of pensions in the two
jobs. As ii, the last section, Cc is calculated as the average hourly
amount of wage; plus pension accruals from the start of the period (1978)
to either the individual 's expected retirement age or to the age of normal
retirement in the individual's pension plan (if he has one), whichever is
earlier.Ca is calculated similarly between the same dates. The
rationale is that given the positive effects of tenure on wages and the
typical backloading of pension benefits toward the end of the job, if an
individual will ever find it advantageous to switch jobs before the normal
retirement age, it will be as soon as possible. Hence the appropriate
comparison is the total compensation in the two jobs from the current date
until the normal retirement age in the plan or until the individuals
expected retirement date if that is earlier.
As mentioned earlier, the 1978 job is not observed for all individuals
because of the manner in which the job history was collected. C canntt
be calculited for these individuals, and this requires another equation to
describe whether or not it is observed. This selection equation may be
written as
11(4) I X4B4 +
wherethe 1978 job is observed if Iis positiv, and is not observed
otherwise. To be valid as a selection equation3 X must include all the
explanatory variables in both the mobility and compensation equations
above. Similarly, Ca is not observed for individuals who remained in
their 1978 jobs at least through 1983. Normally this would require another
selection equation, but the selection equation in this case is the mobility
equation, which is already included in the model. Hence a separate
additional equation is not required.
The model is regarded as having a correlation matrix E among the
various €s which is completely free. For estimation, it will be helpful
to substitute from equations (2) and (3) for ln(Ca) and ln(C) in
equation (1). This yields







To facilitate the presentation of the estimation procedure, a slight
change in notation will be convenient. Specifically, denote the compound




Also,to simplify notation, let be equal to for the remaining
equations, and denote the correlation matrix for the as E'. The
correlation matrix E for the, original s can be derived from by
straightforward calculations, if desired,
Estimates of the model are obtained by maximum likelihood.It is
12assumed that the error terms are statistically independent of the
explanatory variables in theX vectors in the various equations. The
likelihood function for the model is simply the product of the probability
densities for the individual observations. The form of these probability
densities depends on which compensation values are observed. There are
three possible cases, as foLlows. First, consider the case where the 1978
job is included in the job history and where the individual did change jobs
during the period, so that both compensation values are observed. The
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(2) and (31 using the
explanatory variables.
The second case arises if the 1978 job is not observed and the
individual changed jobs during the period. This implies that the
compensation value for the 1978 current job, isnotobserved but that
the compensation value for the alternative job, is observed. The




This expression is different in two respects from the expression in the
previous example. First the limits in the second integral are changed to
reflect the lack of observation for the 1978 job. Also, the expression his
in effect been integrated out with respect to the residual in the
equation determining the unobserved compensation value in 1978.
13
the deterministic parts of equations (1) and (41,
indexes the individual. isavector of the four
taking on the values solved for from equations
observed compensation values and the values of theThe third case occurs if the 1978 job is observed and the individual
remained in the job over the period. Here, C is observed but Ca ii






This is the same kind of integral as in the previous case, except for
obvious changes in the integration limits and the substitution of
which can be computed in this case, for£31 which cannot.
There is one data problem which is relevant to the estimation
procedure,The data necessary to construct wage information for a
particular job are missing in about 15 percent of the cases. An ideal
solution would be to use separate selection equations for these
cases, but doing so would increase the dimensionality of the cumulative
normal to be evaluated by two dimensions and would make the estimation
procedure computationally much more difficult.Instead, we make the
assumption that the process inducing the omissions is orthogonal to the
explanatory variables and error terms in the various equations. The
likelihood function can then be integrated out with respect to the error
terms associated with misting wages. This would cause 4or
depending on which wage is missing1 to be dropped from the appropriate
probability density formula for the observation. For example, suppose that
the 1978 job is observed and a job change did occur, but that the 1978 wage
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If instead the 1978 job is not observed, a .iob change did occur, and the
alternative job wage is missing, the probability density would be
14A
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Havingconstructed the log—likelihood from the sum of the logs of the
probabilities of the individual observations, maximum likelihood estimates
are obtained by maximizing this function with respect to the parameters in
the model, which include u1 the $s, and the elements of the
correlation matrix E.The maximization technique is a scoring algorithm
with a linear search along the indicated direction in combination with the
Derndt—Hall—Hall—Hausman routine for evaluating the expected second
derivative matrix. This algorith, also provides asymptotic standard errors
for the estimated parameters of the model.
V. Empirical Specification.
The variables included in the model are indicated along the left side
of Table 4.Since most of these variables are standard, discussion of them
will be brief. It may be noted that several of the employment—related
variables, including industry, occupation, union status and firm size,
refer to the longest job. This is necessitated because information on
these variables for the 1978 job is not available for everyone in the
sample, as noted previously.It is hoped that since the longest job
variables refer to a major labor force experience, they will be fairly
indicative of the 1978 job as well. Another temporal mismatch imposed by
the nature of the data set concerns several of the household variables,
including marital status, the presence of children, home ownership, and
whether the wife was employed. The values of these variables pertain to
1983, the year In which the data set was collected, although again it would
be preferable to use values for 1978 if that were possible.
The mobility equation is identified by excluding the firm size and
15pension variable;. These two variable; are expected to influence primarily
compensation levels, and they should not have a direct effect on mobility
except to the extent that they are associated with higher or lower
compensation in the two jobs. There are reasonible ground; to debate the
exclusion of these two variables, however, and the potential consequences
of this choice are discussed in a liter section. With regard to the two
compensation equations, identification is achieved by excluding the
household variables.7
Before moving to the estimates for the model, one problem with the
dependent variables should be noted. The pension provider data in the
survey are available only for jobs held in 1983, and even then there are
some individuals who claim they are eligible for pensions but for whom
pension provider records are absent in the data set, and other individuals
for whom pension provider records are available but seriously deficient In
some critical regard. No pension provider information at all is available
for the small group of individuals who indicated a pension in 1978 but
changed jobs before 1983. One way to deal with the problem is to treat
missing pension provider information simply at one more cause for missing
compensation observation; and to deal with it in exactly the same way as
missing wage information was dealt with above. However, in this case
another option is used, namely to impute pensions based on pensionprovider
information for other individuals in the sample with similar industry,
occupation and union status. Specifically, the sample is divided into
cells according to three—digit industries, three occupations, and union
status. For any individual who is missing pension provider information1
the pension component of compensation is taken as the weightedaverage
compensation which would result from other pensions in the same cell.If
16there are no pension provider observations in that cell, then cells are
collapsed to two—digit or one—digit industries, as required, until a non—
empty cell is found.In total, imputations are made for about two—fifths
(41%) of the pension values. 23% are imputed on the basis of three—digit
industry cells and 7% and 9% on the basis of two—digit and one—digit
industry cells, respectively, all using the correct occupation category and
union status. The remaining 2% are imputed by collapsing across
occupations, with 1% using three—digit industry and 1% using two—digit
industry cells. In no cases are union plans used to impute nonunion plans,
or vice—versa.
VI. Empirical Results.
The remainder of Table 4 presents estimates of the model. The first
column reports estimates for what might be called a reduced form mobility
equation, in which mobility is related to the exogenous variables in the
model. This equation is estimated as a single equation probit. The most
notable feature of these estimates is the overwhelming impact of the
pension variable. At the means of the other explanatory variables,
mobility is estimated to be about 54 percentage points lower for
individuals with pensions, an effect which is in line with the descriptive
statistics presented earlier. Home ownership also has a significant and
sizable effect on mobility, reducing it by 23 percentage points at the
means. The remaining significant variable is experience. The positive
sign on this variable might at first seem surprising1 but an additional
year of experience is accompanied by another year of age and by a reduction
in the number of years until expected retirement, so that the total effect
of becoming another year older is claie to nil. More surprising, perhaps,
is that several variables which might be expected to affect mobility do not
17show up well in this data. For example, unions should depress mobility
both because of high union wages and because of improvement in the
employees' voice' in the firm, and yet the estimated coefficient is
insignificant and positive. Large firms usually provide high wages and
enhanced promotion opportunities, both of which should reduce mobility, and
yet this coefficient is also insignificant and positive. Both of these are
positively correlated with pension status, and it would appear that pension
status is the variable to which the effect is overwhelmingly attributed.
The remaining columns of the table present the results of the maximum
likelihood estimator of the full model, as described in Section tV.8 With
this procedure, the maximum of the likelihood function is achieved at the
boundary defined by the requirement that the estimated correlation matrix
for the error terms(E*)be positive definite. The standard errors Table
4 are therefore the result of a constrained estimation, with all of the
correlation parameters except the correlation between the selection and
mobility equations being treated as free, and this last correlation
calculated as the value necessary to just meet the positive
semidefiniteness requirement. As a result of this procedure, no standard
error is estimated for this correlation, as indicated in the table, and the
estimated standard errors for the remaining correlations should be
interpreted with this constraint in mind.
In the mobility equation, only two of the variables are significant at
standard levels. One of these, however, is the compensation gain variable
which is of particular interest in this study, and its impact on mobility
is by far the largest. These estimates imply that a lOX gain in this
variable would result in a 8.3 percentage point increase in Job mobility.
The other significant variable is home ownership, which is estimated to
reduce job mobility considerably. Among the remaining variables, union
18membership ha; the expected negative effect on mobility and is sizable, but
not significant.
In the 1978 job compensation equation, the significant coefficients
all have the expected signs, and quite a few of the coefficients are
significant. Compensation is positively related to education, firm size,
union membership, managementlprofessional occupations, pension eligibility,
and SMSA residency, and is lower for blacks. For compensation in an
alternate job, only education has a clearly significant impact, in the
positive direction, but several others hover close to significance,
including union membership, SMSA residency, and white collar occupations.
The 1978 job selection equation confirms the impression thataverage
compensation values calculated in Table 2 are not much affected by the
inclusion or exclusion of the 1978 job from the Job history. Only one
variable, home ownership, is significant in this equation, and this
variable is not a determinant of compensation. Also, the correlations
between the error term in this equation and the error terms of the two
compensation equations are not significant, implying that the observability
of the 1978 job does not much influence compensation values through
unobserved factors either.
The other correlation ultimate; contain few iurprises. The error
terms in the two compensation equations are moderately correlated at 0.45,
and the correlation is significant. Also significant and relatively large,
at 0.61, is the correlation between the errors in the mobility equation and
the alternative job compensation equation. This would suggest that
individuals whose high alternative job compensation is high for unobserved
reasons are also more likely to change jobs anyway for unobserved reasons.
Most striking among the correlations in E, however, is the exceedingly
19high negative correlation between the error terms in the 1978 job selection
equation and the mobility equation. Not surprisingly, the same unobserved
factors which predispose an individual toward changing jobs also make it
mare likely that the job history will miss the job held in 1978.
VII. Simulations
This section explores the results of two sets of simulations with the
model, These simulations are performed as follows. For each individual,
the nonstochastic parts of equations (1') and (4) are calculated as N and
I, respectively. Given Iandthe observation about whether or not the
1978 job is actually observed, it is possible to calculate the range of
values for that is consistent with this choice (If the 1978 job
* involveda pension, Ias infinitely positive and the whole range of €4
is consistent with observation). Also, if compensation in either the
current or alternative job is observed, it is possible to calculate the
values of 4and giventhe coe4ficient estimates and the values for
the explanatory variables in equations (2) and (3). From these values for
* * *
and£3 and the range of values for £41it ispossible to calculate
I the:onditzonal mean and variance for c using standard multivariate
normal formulae. The projected probability that the individual would have
changed jobs in the five—year interval is simply the integral of the
* A
probabilitydensity for s above the value of—N. The simulated
mobility rate for the sample is the sample average of the mobility
probabilities for the individuals in the sample. In the results presented
below, the simulated mobility rates are weighted averages, but some runs
with unweighted averages gave very close to the same results.
Model Validation.
The first question of interest is how well the model predicts the
20actual mobility rate, bath for the sample as a whole and for important
subgroups within the sample. The simulations relevant for this question
are presented in Table 5.The first column in the table gives the observed
mobility rate for the group in question during the live—year period, while
the middle column gives the mobility rate which the model would simulate
using the explanatory variables for that particular group.
Two things are evident from the table. First, the simulations capture
the disparities in mobility rates among very different groups rather well.
For example1 the actual live—year job mobility for individuals in the
sample is about 47 percentage points higher for individuals without
pensions than for individuals with pensions, and the entire amount of this
differential is reflected in the simulated mobility rates. This is
particularly encouraging because pensions are not an explicit explanatory
variable in the mobility equation in the model. A similar result holds,
though less dramatically, when the mobility rates are compared between
union members and others.In this case, the mobility rate among union
members is a bit over 12 percentage points lower than for individuals not
in unions, and again the whole amount of this differential is reflected in
the simulation results. Thus, the simulation model does appear to do a
good job of predicting differences in the mobility rates of various groups,
even of some groups not explicitly represented in the mobility equation
itself.
The second thing evident from the table is that the simulations are
consistently one to two percentage points high. The reasons for this are
not entirely clear, but it may have something to do with the fact that the
likelihood maximization occurred along a boundary. In any case, this
overestimation is quite small when compared to the large scale differences
21in mobility rates among different groups, and it does not seem to have
affected the ability of the model to predict these differences among groups
successfully.
Policy Simulations of Pension Effects.
Table 6 reports on simulations which are intended to shed some light
on the question: What is the role of pensions in affecting job mobility?
The first part of the table conducts the following hypothetical experiment.
For each individual in a pension covered job, calculate the value of the
pension rights at the individuals expected retirement date or the plan's
normal retirement age, whichever is earlier. Now suppose that a defined
contribution plan of the same value were paid to the individual, so that
the backloading which typically occurs in pension plan! is eliminated. For
most pension—covered individuals3 this would mean that a greater percentage
of the value of the pension would be accrued earlier and a smaller
percentage later.In terms of the model, this would lower the value of
C, which would presumably reduce incentives to remain on the same job.
By how much would this change in the time path of compensation increase Job
mobility?
The answer to this question is given in the top part of Table 6, both
for the sample of individuals covered by pensions as a whole and for some
specific subgroups. For the group as a whole, the simulated five year
nobility rate with the observed compensation is 10.3%, and with the pension
changes described in the last paragraph1 the mobility rate rises only to
11.6%. This small effect is in line with the fact that backloading raises
compensation between 197B and th. expected retirement age by only about
three percent, which is a relatively small amount. This in turn occurs
because even for individuals who stay until retirement, pensions account
22for only about one—eighth of the total value of compensation. Alto1 most
of the individuals in the sample are still a number of years away from
retirement, and for them the elimination of the capital loss in the
hypothetical experiment, pro—rated over the remainder of their years in the
job, is relatively small.
One might expect the effect to be larger among the older individuals
in the group, who are nearer the retirement ages specified in the plans and
for whom the incentive effects of backloading should be greater. The
second row in the table presents the results for this group. They are
indeed more affected by the backloading, but the increase in their mobility
rates is only about 2.5 percentage points over the five year period. This
is still very small when compared to the nearly 50 percentage point
difference in the mobility rates of those with and without penmions. Nor
is the effect very large among either union or non—union members as a
group, as indicated by the next two rows in the table.
The next line of the table investigates the question: What might
happen if pensions were to be eliminated altogether from the compensation
of individuals in pension covered jobs, and no compensating adjustments in
wages or other benefits were made? This serves to eliminate both the
effect of the pension backloadimg as well as the effect of the pension
value Itself from the mobility rate. As the numbers in the table indicate,
eliminating pensions completely would have over four times the effect on
mobility as compared simply to eliminating the backtoading of pensions, but
the effect is still relatively small compared to the total differential In
mobility between those with and without pensions.
In the last line of the table, we analyze the effects of changing the
compensation gain measure in the mobility equation by that amount which is
indicated by the estieated pension coefficients in the compensation
23equations. The estimate; of the compensation equation; suggest a pension
in the 1978 job reduces ln(Ca), the alternative job compensation1 by
0.362. Similarly, a pension in the 1978 job Increases lncCc), the
compensation in that Job, by 0.392. Hence1 the effect of a pension on the
difference, which is the compensation gain, is to lower it by 0.754. In
other words, if the pension variable had a value of zero rather than one,
the gain measure would be higher by 0.754. To simulate the effect of this
change, the value of IIin the simulations is simply increased by 0.754
times the coefficient of the compensation gain variable. The results of
this simulation are indeed striking. Job mobility would increase to 52.3Z,
which is very close to the measured mobility for those without pensions, as
reported in Table 1.
This result is sensitive to the estimated difference in pension
coefficients in the two compensation equations, and these coefficients,
particularly in the alternative job equation, are not precisely estimated.
However, although the estimated difference of 0.754 may seem rather large,
it is within the ball park when compared to the difference in the mean logs
of compensation in the data, which from Table 2 is given as 0.568.
Further, even if the difference and its associated impact on job mobility
were cut in half, it would be very difficult to avoid the conclusion that
the reason that mobility in pension jobs is so low is mostly because
pension Jobs pay a high compensation premium. Only a relatively minor role
appears to be played by the fact that most pensions are typically
backloaded and concentrate their benefits toward the end of the job.
Specification and Bias.
A major innovation in this model is the use of a specific equation for
opportunity compensation so as to be able to construct the compensation
24gain measure in the mobility equation. An alternative approach, which does
not require a separate equation for opportunity compensation, would be to
include separately variables for current compensation and pension capital
loss, as in Allen, Clark and McDermed (19G7). To investigate potential
biases in these approaches, not! that the mobility equations in both are
nested within the more general specification
II 81C0 +82C
+ + .
whereCis the opportunity conpensation,C is the compensation
"premium," that is, the difference between current and opportunity
compensation, and
C1is a measure of potential pension capital losses.
The approach taken by Allen, Clark and I'lcDermed, which includes current
compensation in the equation without separating It into its opportunity
compensation and compensation premium components, effectively imposes the
constraint 8iB. Our own approach combines compensation premia and
pension capital losses into the compensation gain variable —(C +
C1),
where Cis a present discounted value stream. This implies the
constraint 82 83. For reasons of indentifiability, we also omit
opportunity compensation from the mobility equation, but since there is no
particular reason why opportunity compensation per se should influence
mobility, this exclusion should be innocuous.9
We believe that in the presence of premia, the constraint
82 83
rather than =
82is the appropriate one. From the employee's side,
the compensation factor which should most strongly influence the decision
to change jobs is the difference between the current job and the best
alternative. Part of this difference is the pension capital lass which the
individual will keep if he stays on the current job but will forfeit if he
25goes. Anotherpart is the capitalized value of any premia which the
individual enjoys on the current job. The individual loses both parts if
he departs1 and there is no reason why he should give the premium part any
less weight than the capital loss part in his decision. On the employer's
side, firm reputation effects may inhibit firms from laying off employees
with large potential capital losses from pensions.If the purpose of
potential capital losses is to induce employees to stay with the firm
and/or not to shirk, however, the potential lass of the compensation
premium upon separation should have the same effect. Layoffs by the firms
reduce the effectiveness of either type of potential loss in discouraging
mobility and shirking, and hence it should the total size of the loss,
rather than the division between pension loss and premium loss, which
should govern the firm's incentive not to tarnish its reputation.
There is a growing body of evidence to indicate that the possibility
of large premia should at least be considered. For example, Krueger and
Summers (1987) find that after standardizing for the usual human capital
variables, the wage premia in two—digit industries have a standard
deviation of about 15%, and that the structure of these premia ii highly
stable over time.In our own work, the descriptive statistics in Table 2
above suggest premia of comparable magnitude in pension jobs. Moreover,
premia of this magnitude are very large in comparison to pension capital
losses, since the capital losses tend to be only 3% or so of the present
discounted value of compensation for most workers with pensions.
If these premia exist and are of sizable value, then the imposition of
the constraint =
82may strongly bias estimates of 8 and 2' and
of83 as well.A reasonable presumption is that 8, the coefficient
of the opportunity compensation, is small, since as noted before there is
no particular reason why opportunity compensation per se should Influence
26mobility. Imposing the constraint — whenthe true relation is
< 62 would likely result in an estimated coefficient which is less than
the true value of 82.Further, if the premia and pension capital losses
are positively correlated, as seems likely, then the capital loss variable
would pick up explanation which should be attributed to the premia.Thus,
imposing Bj =82is expected to bias downward and 83 upward.
These effects can be seen in the results of the study by Allen, Clark
and PlcDermed (19871. They employ a mobility equation with current
compensation and pension capital loss variables, which imposes
616.
As expected from the preceding analysis of bias, their estimate of
831
the effect of backloading, is much larger than ours.In a sample from the
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), they estimate thatbackloading
reduces seven—year mobility rates by 18.6 percentag, points (p. 28), and in
another sample from the National Longitudinal Survey (NLS)
,theyestimate
the reduction in five—year mobility rates to be 8.1percentage points (p.
31). Also, their estimate of83 is implausibly large relative to the
estimate of 621 further suggesting the possibility of biases of thetype
discussed above.In their PSID results, for example, they find that an
increase of $1000 in pension capital losses would decreasemobility by 3.7
percentage points, while an increase of $1 per hour in compensation would
decrease mobility by 1.1 percentage points. This means that a $1000
capital loss Is estimated to have the same impact on mobility as a $3per
hour compensation premium, despite the fact that over the 15—20years until
retirement, the $3 per hour premium will amount to around $100,000. Given
thit one might expect capital losses and premia to havecomparable effects,
such results suggest that the biases from imposing81 •8may be large.
With regard to other Issues of specification, the assumptions that
27have been made in this study have generally been such that the results
would be expected to be biased in the direction of finding larger effects
of pension backloading than in fact exist. First, the pension variable is
omitted completely from the mobility equation. This forces the very
substantial pension effect in the reduced form equation to work entirely
through the compensation gain measure, thus probably biasing this
coefficient upward if pensions do have a direct effect in the mobility
equation or if they are proxying for other variables which should enter the
that equation. Secondly, the firm size variable is also omitted from the
mobility equation. Since firm size is positively related to compensation
premia, this omission would tend to bias the coefficient of the
compensation gain measure upward as long as the direct effect of firm size
on mobility is negative. This would be expected, for example, if the
greater advancement opportunities in large firms reduce mobility incentives
there. Third, primarily due to a lack of identifying variables,
the model has treated a dollars worth of expected pensions ashavingthe
same value as a dollar of earnings.In fact, most people would argue that
because of the greater uncertainty regarding the eventual receipt of
pensions, they should be valued at some lesser amount. This would mean,
however, that even more of the effect of pensions on mobility should be
attributed to the wage premia and even less to pensions and backloading
than we have in fact found. Finally, we have not included the possibility
that those individuals In pension jobs have a lower inherent propensity to
change jobs, as in Allen1 Clark and McDermed (1987). This means that the
part of the effect of pensions on mobility which is in fact due to
heterogeneity is instead attributed to compensation and backloading, again
tending to overstate the effect of backloading. Hence, we conclude that
our small estimates of the effects of pension backloading on mobility are,
28if anything, likely to be an overstatement of the true effects.
VIII. Summary and Conclusions.
This study has investigated the relationship between economic
incentives and job mobility. The model used to estimate thisrelationship
contains two important features which are not usually found in other
studies of job mobility. For one, it uses a detaileddescription of the
pension plan, as provided by the employers of the individuals in the
sample, to construct accurate measures of the financial incentives against
job mobility which pension plans are widely thought to provide.Also, the
propensity to change jobs is characterized as depending1 among other
things, on the difference in compensation that an individual can obtain on
his current job and on the best alternative job.
Two strong conclusions can be drawn from the results of thispaper.
The first of these has to do with estimation: the failure toseparate
compensation into its opportunity compensation and compensation premium
components may severely bias the estimated effects of economic incentives
in mobility equations. Specifically, estimated effects ofpension capital
losses may be sharply overestimated if possible premia in pension jobsare
not taken into account. The second conclusion is more of apolicy nature,
namely, that the role of the typical backloading of pensions in restricting
job mobility seems fairly small for most individuals. Although the
estimates indicate that potential compensation gains in in alternative job
have a strong effect in reducing mobility, the small size of the
backloading relative to compensation premia in pension Jobs means that only
a small amount of the difference in mobility rates between individuals with
and without pensions is attributable to the backloading.
The findings reported here have some implications for theongoing
29debate as to the relative importance of tilting the compensation profile
and using efficiency wages as devices for raising worker productivity. The
examination of compensation on current and alternative Jobs suggests that
on pension covered Jobs, compensation premia constitute a much more
important fraction of the loss from Job termination than does backloading
of pension benefits. Simulations with the mobility equation confirm that
it is not backloading, but wage premia that accounts for the large
differente in mobility between pension covered and noncovered jobs.
In so far as the compensation tilt and efficiency wage models incorporate
penalties from turnover and worker response to these penalties1 these
findings provide greater support for the efficiency wage view.
30Footnotes
i.The expression '1backloading of benefit!" is sometimes used to refer to
a weighting scheme whereby the pension formula explicitly gives greater
weight to later than to earlier years of employment. In the context of
this paper1 backloading refer! to the positive slope of the accrual
profile that results even when all years of work receive equal weight
in the pension benefits formula,
2.Efficiency wages refer to wages paid in excess of the competitive wage
by profit maximizing firms in order to increase productivity. For a
discussion, see Krueger and Summers (1986), For a discussion of
related work by earlier generations of labor economists, see Segal
(1986).
3.Agricultural and self—employment are screened on the basis of the
individual's longest job, since information on these characteristics is
not always available for the 1978 job.
4.If the individual was unemployed in 1983, he was considered a mover if
previous job began after 1918, and a stayer if his previous job began
before 1978. This effectively measures mobility as the taking of a new
job, and not as the separation (which may or may not be temporary) from
an old job.
5. The general growth rate of nominal wages used in the calculations ii
the 30 year average from 1953—83, and the discount factor is taken to
be equaltothe general growth rate of nominal wages. For the
procedurefollowedIf the individual 's pension record was missing or
defective1 see Section IV.
6.These figures are based on all movers in the sample, regardless of
whether compensation amounts are observed.
7.Since the same variables are included in the two compensation
equations, the vectors and X3 are identical empirically. We
continue the notational distinction in order to maintain the
correspondence between the X vectors and the vectors.
8.By the construction of the data set, all 1978 jobs with pensions are
observed. Hence, the pension coefficient in the 1978 job selection
equation has an implied value of "0andis not estimated.
9. Given thu problem with the unobserved 1978 jobs in the SCF, including
opportunity compensation would require equations to project
compensation gain and opportunity compensation separately in equation
(1'), and we lack sufficient good instruments to do so.
31Table 1
Pension, and Job Mobility
With Without
Pension Pension Both
Mobility rate in percent 8.8% 55. 9% 28.0%
Average age (in 1978) 39.7 39.3 39.5
Average experience (in 1978) 20.2 19.9 20.1
Average education 12.8 12.1 12.5
Percent in manufacturing in 48.3 26,4 39.4
longest job
Percent white collar in 8.2 10.1 9.0
longest lob
Percent management and 30.8 31.7 31.2
professional In longest job
Percent union in longest Job 48.9 18.5 36.6
Percent in firms larger than 100 87.3 49.3 71.7
employees in longest Job
Percent residing in an SIISA 64.7 51.1 59.1
Average years until expected 22.3 24.0 23.0
retirement (in 1978)
Percent married 89.1 85.9 87.8
Percent with children under 18 61.6 67.0 63.8
Percent who own home 85.2 76.2 81.5
Percent with employed spouses 55.6 59.0 57.0
Percent black 6.0 9.3 7.4
Number of Observations 331 227 558
32Table 2
Pensions and Compensation
411 Individuals Job Changer; with
with Observations Observations
for 1970 Jab for Both Jobs
With Without With Without
Pensions Pensions Pensions Pensions
Log of average discounted
hourly compensation in
1978 job to retirement 2.67 2.10 2.70 2.13
(standard deviation) (0.47) (0.64) (0.33) (0.62)
Log of average discounted
hourly compensation in
alternative job to retirement 2.51 2.29
(standard deviation) (0.54) (0,64)
Average age (in 1978) 39.3 39.2 38.7 38.4
Average experience (in 1978) 19.9 19.4 19.3 20.7
Average education 12.8 11.9 13.1 11.7
Percent in manufacturing in 48.3 20.0 55.6 23.3
longest Job
Percent white collar in 8.0 7.3 0.0 6.7
longest job
Percent manage,ent and 29,4 36.4 38.9 33.3
professional in longest job
Percent union in longest job 50.0 15.5 72.2 10.0
Percent in firms larger than 100 86.4 40.0 77.8 40.0
employees in longest job
Percent residing in an SMSA 63.3 51.8 72.2 60.0
Average years until expected 22.6 24.4 23.9 26.1
retirement (in 1978)
Percent married 89.5 84.5 77.8 90.0
Percent with children under 18 63.3 70.9 72.2 80.0
Percent who own home 83.9 74.5 44.4 76.7
Percent with employed spouses 57.3 59.1 44.4 63.3
Percent black 6.3 10.9 0.0 3.3
Number of Observations 286 110 18 30
33Table 3
Decompositi on of Pensi on/Non—Pension
Compensation Differential
Components Percent
Compensation of of Total
Level Differential Differential
Mean Log of Compensation of 2.671
Individuals with Pensions
0.027 4.BX
Mean Log of Compensation of
Individuals with Pensions, 2.644
Excluding Pension Tilt
0.112 19.7
Mean Log of Compensation of
Individuals with Pensions, 2.532
Excluding Value of Pensions
0.429 75.5
Ilean Log of Compensation of






Form Compensation Eqns. 1978 Job
Mobility Mobility 1978 Alterna— Selection
Equation Equation Job tive Job Equation
Constant —0.253 0.431 1.248 0.796 —1.164
(0.17) (0.16) (4.63) (0.72) (0.46)
Years of Experience 0.056 0.044 —0.004 0.000 —0.028
in 1978 (2.61) (1.29) (0.93) (0.02) (0.95)
(0.02] (0.02]
Years of Education 0.030 —0.034 0.087 0.122 —0.005
in 1978 (0.96) (0.48) (8.07) (4.16) (0.11)
(0.013 (—0.01]
* Manufacturing in 0.166 0.279 0.074 0.055 —0,034
Longest Job (1.04) (0.86) (1.42) (0.39) (0.14)
(0.063 (0.12]
ft White Collar in 0.316 —0.398 0,064 0.454 —0.500
Longest Job (1.22) (0.78) (0.78) (1.95) (1.39)
(0.11] (—0.17]
* Management/Professional —0,028 0.145 0.226 0.135 0.185
in Longest Job (0.15) (0.47) (3.59) (0.97) (0.64)
(—0.013 (0.061
ftUnionin Longest 0.023 —0.342 0,110 0.304 —0,087
Job (0.12) (0.99) (2.10) (1,70) (0.32)
(0.01] (—0.15]
Years Until Expected 0.027 0.016 —0.006 0.001 0.001
Retirement (1.48) (0.45) (1.35) (0.07) (0.03)
(0.01] (0.01]
* SMSA in 1983 0.098 —0.175 0.109 0.228 0.170
(0.67) (0.64) (2.32) (1.86) (0.80)
£0.03] (—0.083
ft Race (Black) in 1983 —0.488 0.180 —0.186 —0.513 0.287
(1.70) (0.23) (2.12) (1.37) (0.74)
(0.16] (0.081
*FirmSize > 100 in 0.095 0.120 —0.019 —0.279
Longest Job (0.64) (2.14) (0.19) (1.27)
(0.03]
*PensionCoverage in —1.610 0.392 —0.362





Form Compensation Eqns. 1978 Job
Mobility Mobility 1978 Alterna— Selection




Age in 1978 0.027 —0.020 0.037
(0.88) (0.56) (0.70)
£0.01) (—0.01]
*Marriedin 1983 0.084 0.192 0.010
(0.32) (0.64) (0.02)
[0.03] [0.08]
*ChildrenUnder 18 0.205 0.119 0.028
in 1983 (1.18) (0.62) (0.10)
£0.07] £0.05]
*HomeOwnership in —0.668 —0.773 0.600
1983 (4.01) (3.90) (2.34)
(—0.23] (—0.333
*WifeEmployed in 0.038 —0.071 0.054
1983 (0.24) (0.44) (0.22)
(0.01] (—0.03]
Standard Deviation 1.00 1.00 0.411 0.565 1.00
of Error Term —— —— (26.911 (9.00) ——
1.00 0.14 0.61 —0.95
—— (1.01) (3.14) ——







Number of Observations 558 558
Note: Figures in parenthese, are asymptotic absolute t—statistics.Figures
in brackets are derivatives at the means, where appropriate.






Full Sample 28.0% 29.8% 558
Individuals with Pensions 8.8 10.1 331
Individuals without Pensions 55.9 58.4 227
Union Members 20.1 21.2 204
Not Union Members 32.5 34.9 354
Table 6




Effects of Converting Defined Benefit
Plans to Defined Contribution
Plans of Equal Value
All Individuals with Pensions 10.3% 11.6% 558
46—50 Year Olds 9.8 12.3 54
Union Members 11.8 13.3 143
Not Union Members 8.9 9.8 143
Effects of Dropping Pension
Compensation Entirely 10.3 15.7 286
Effects of Higher Compensation in
Pension Jobs3 As Measured by
Compensation Equation Estimates 10.3 52.3 286
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